SSC20-WKII-06
A Deeper Look into the Ionospheric Scintillation eXplorer (ISX): A Failure Analysis
John M. Bellardo, Grigory Heaton, Cassandra Kraver, Dave Pignatelli, Ryan Nugent, Alicia Johnstone, Pauline
Faure
California Polytechnic State University, San Luis Obispo
1 Grand Ave, Cal Poly, San Luis Obispo, CA, 93407; +1 (805) 756-5087
bellardo@calpoly.edu, gheaton@calpoly.edu, ckraver@calpoly.edu, dpignate@calpoly.edu, rnugent@calpoly.edu,
aijohnst@calpoly.edu, pfaure@calpoly.edu
ABSTRACT
The Ionospheric Scintillation eXplorer (ISX) mission is a collaboration between SRI International and Cal Poly.
The ISX space weather investigation seeks to better understand the physics of naturally occurring Equatorial Spread
F ionospheric irregularities by deploying a passive UHF radio scintillation receiver. Rocket Lab’s Electron-4 launch
vehicle successfully placed ISX into a nearly sun synchronous orbit 500km above the surface of the Earth, however
contact was never made with the spacecraft. Since this anomaly, Cal Poly has taken an extensive look into the
possible failure causes on ISX, including a system level fault tree and additional testing with the engineering test
unit. The primary takeaway from the failure analysis is the importance of testing beyond what is considered normal
for CubeSats. The second main conclusion reinforces the important role that adequately documenting the spacecraft
design, fabrication, and testing plays in performing a post hoc failure analysis. In addition to presenting analysis
outcomes, this paper addresses both of these main takeaways.
INTRODUCTION

to failure analysis is even more important in a
university setting due to the high turnover rates of
students and the number of other activities vying for
their limited time. Documenting failures, solutions, and
lessons learned allows the organization to grow, rather
than remain stagnant. The process begins by
determining every possible cause of a no-contact
condition on orbit, including all material, electrical, and
software faults. Then, all available documentation is
reviewed for any evidence that would provide insight
into each possible cause. An additional benefit of this
process is that it highlights specific areas where
additional documentation or inspections are warranted.
Additional testing, using the flight-similar engineering
unit, is performed as appropriate. From there, the likely
causes of the anomaly are identified, and process
changes for future missions are put into place.

The Ionospheric Scintillation eXplorer (ISX) mission is
an NSF funded collaboration between Cal Poly’s
CubeSat Lab (CPCL) and SRI International. ISX seeks
to better understand the physics of naturally occurring
Equatorial Spread F ionospheric irregularities by
deploying a passive UHF radio scintillation receiver.
Plasma irregularities are naturally occurring
ionospheric structures that can significantly degrade the
performance of satellite-based communication and
navigation systems. In particular, ionospheric storms
causing major equatorial ionospheric disturbances
strongly degrade Global Positioning System (GPS)
signals over the equatorial regions.
ISX was launched on December 16th, 2018 as part of
the ELaNa-19 mission. Rocket Lab’s Electron-4 launch
vehicle successfully placed ISX into a nearly sun
synchronous orbit 500km above the surface of the
Earth, however contact was never made with the
spacecraft. Since this anomaly, Cal Poly has taken an
extensive look into the possible causes of this failure
mode on ISX, including a system level fault tree and
additional testing with the engineering test unit.

The primary takeaway from the failure analysis is the
importance of testing beyond what is considered normal
for CubeSats. The second main conclusion reinforces
the important role that adequately documenting the
spacecraft design, fabrication, and testing plays in
performing a post hoc failure analysis. The remaining
sections of this paper include a more detail description
of ISX’s mission, a more detail description of the
spacecraft architecture, a recap of the most applicable
branches in the fault tree, and a conclusion that
addresses the main takeaways.

The failure analysis included reviewing design,
processes, procedures, and potential anomalies that may
have slipped through the cracks. A methodic approach
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Figure 1: The physical layout of the 3U ISX CubeSat
ISX MISSION

functionality with EPS and UHF communication
support in a highly integrated package. The primary
processor is an Atmel ATSAM91G45 running a heavily
customized embedded Linux operating system. It
provides general management of the satellite bus and
provide an interface to the UHF radio that commands
the satellite. It contains 64MB of redundant flight
software storage. An additional 512MB of NAND flash
memory and 8GB on a microSD card is available to
store telemetry data.

ISX is an ionospheric passive UHF radio mission
developed in response to NSF’s 2014 CubeSat-based
Science Missions for Geospace and Atmospheric
Research solicitation. ISX mission goals are to better
understand the physics of naturally occurring Equatorial
Spread F ionospheric irregularities—a space weather
phenomenon that can severely degrade the performance
of U.S. national communication and navigation assets.
Deploying a passive radio scintillation receiver, the ISX
mission will acquire worldwide digital television
broadcast signals with an on-orbit CubeSat radio
receiver to yield a unique geometry for characterizing
the climatology and evolution of 100-m-scale
ionospheric structures—features inaccessible to groundbased observation. These globally observed ionospheric
irregularities, driven by interaction of naturally
occurring strong electric fields and ionospheric plasma
gradients, result from a chaotic interplay of solar
magnetic and ultraviolet forcing of Earth’s upper
atmosphere.

The integrated UHF radio is combined with a near
omni-directional L dipole antenna to serve as the
primary radio for commanding the spacecraft. A second
L dipole is located on the nadir pointing end of the
satellite to serve as the 500-700MHz antenna for the
ISX payload receiver. The UHF radio is capable of up
to 1W of transmit power with years of operating
heritage at 9600 bits per second.

SPACECRAFT DESIGN OVERVIEW

The avionics bus incorporates a built-in EPS that
includes a variety of electrical protection systems. Four
8.4W (on Sun nominal) 3U panels support power
generation, and a standalone battery pack of nine
Lithium-Ion cells provides 77 Wh of storage. The solar
panels charge the battery pack at a nominal 11.1V with
a maximum voltage of 12.6V. Power for the satellite is
provided by 24 UTJ solar cells mounted on the side
panels. All the cells on one panel are connected in
series. Each panel is connected in parallel using direct
energy transfer.

ISX is a 3U CubeSat [1], based on Cal Poly’s in-house
satellite bus design. Figure 1 shows the spacecraft’s
physical layout, identifying the key components. The
primary C&DH board, with flight heritage on five other
Cal Poly missions, combines traditional C&DH

ISX uses six solar angle sensors, coupled with six triaxis magnetometers to provide the system with 3-axis
attitude determination. The spacecraft includes this
variety of sensors to introduce redundancy and provide
multiple measurements for the attitude filter. The

The ISX mission investigates ionospheric irregularities
from multiple vantage points to gain insight into
dissipation of Equatorial Spread F (ESF) structures,
which have been measured only in two dimensions. By
gauging the 3D distribution of these ionospheric
irregularities, the ISX mission will advance the state of
space weather forecasting.
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orbital position of the spacecraft is determined using a
GPS receiver which can utilize GPS and GLONASS
constellations. This orbital position is used to assign a
coordinate location and time to scientific
measurements, and feed into the on-board IGRF
magnetic field model used in conjunction with the
attitude determination. Attitude control is achieved by
a passive magnetic system consisting of natural
magnets to align the satellite with the Earth’s magnetic
field.

in the form of a “ping” command, was also attempted
without success.
FAILURE ANALYSIS
Cal Poly undertook a months-long fault tree analysis [2]
after it became clear the spacecraft was experiencing an
anomaly. Although the analysis didn’t identify a single
responsible fault, the process and information generated
is beneficial for future missions. During the course of
the failure analysis numerous tests were performed on
the ISX engineering unit to either refute or support
branches of the fault tree. Documentation kept during
the development and testing of ISX, including
procedures, test reports, and pictures, were also
reviewed during the investigation.

The ISX payload was designed and fabricated by SRI
International. It contains the sensitive SDR to observe
the digital TV transmissions, a SATA III SSD storage
device for recording data during an observation, a
Tegra-3 processor for post-processing the data after an
observation, and the necessary bus connections for
moving the data around. Since it isn’t important to the
failure analysis, further details of the payload
architecture are omitted from this work.

The investigation was broken into three top-level
categories: material, electrical, and software. Important
contributors from each category are detailed in the
following sections.

LAUNCH AND ANOMOLY

MATERIAL FAILURE MODES

ISX was launched on December 16th, 2018 from
Launch Complex 1 located in Mahia, New Zealand, as
part of the ELaNa-19 mission. Rocket Lab’s Electron-4
launch vehicle successfully placed ISX into a nearly
sun synchronous orbit 500km above the surface of the
Earth. Successful deployment was confirmed both by
sensors on the launch vehicle and the number of distinct
objects detected by radar tracking facilities.

This category includes all material-related failures that
could have led to the spacecraft anomaly. The
possibilities presented here are the failure of a
deployment switch, thermal damage to PCB traces, the
failure of a wire modification, and the failure of the
antenna to deploy.

ISX was configured to automatically deploy its antenna
165 minutes after separation from the launch vehicle, at
which time it should begin autonomously transmitting a
telemetry beacon every 7 seconds. Cal Poly began
tracking ISX immediately after launch but was unable
to observe the beacon or otherwise establish contact
with the spacecraft. This early setback was initially
attributed to the uncertainty caused by ISX being one in
a cluster of fifteen spacecraft deployed at a similar time.
As the days wore on and reports from amateur
operators trickled in, it became increasingly clear the
spacecraft was not transmitting. ISX was monitored for
nine months from multiple geographically different
tracking stations without observing a single
transmission.

ISX has two deployment switches, connected in series,
that turn the spacecraft on after separation from the
launch vehicle. If one, or both, of these switches failed
the spacecraft would not turn on. Experience with the
switches across multiple missions has taught us the tiny
devices are fragile and the plastic lever arm that
actuates the button can snap off easily. However, when
the arm breaks the switch fails closed and the spacecraft
would still boot. The possibility of the wire connecting
the switch to the electronics breaking due to the launch
environment was also considered, but considered
unlikely based on assembly documentation, the
expected low loads on the solder joints themselves, and
two prior vibration tests of the flight unit to GEVS
levels without a similar failure. It was determined that
the anomaly was unlikely the result of a deployment
switch failure.

In addition to monitoring, Cal Poly attempted active
recovery of ISX. The spacecraft is designed such that
the radio, when not actively transmitting, is always
listening for ground commands. This provides an
opportunity to uplink commands even if the downlink
RF chain isn’t working correctly. Specifically, the
command to deploy the antenna and turn on the
transmitter was sent to ISX multiple times in case the
on-board logic had malfunctioned. A basic link check,

ISX experienced a ground testing anomaly after a
thermal backout test involving one of the traces on the
PCB that controls the power-on sequence. The trace
expanded and cracked in such a way that minor
physical pressure was required to the board in order for
it to turn on. This issue was resolved pre-flight by
adding a wire modification that bypasses the fragile
trace. After the modification was added the board
returned to its expected behavior. It is possible that
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other traces may have experienced a similar failure,
however that possibility is reduced both by ground
environmental testing that originally identified the
broken trace and the small number of times we have
successfully flown the same avionics board with the
same wire modification. It is also possible that the wire
modification itself failed. The light weight of the
additional wire, plus installation procedures that include
both staking and conformal coating, and vibrations
testing of the modification make this particular failure
also unlikely. Figure 2 shows the wire modification
staked to the system board prior to conformal coating.

has also successfully flown on the DAVE mission prior
to ISX. Since no signal was observed from ISX across
many months of passes this failure mode is unlikely to
have occurred.

Figure 3: The ISX -Z panel, showing the antenna
deployment mechanism in the lower-right corner.
Note the antenna is deployed in this picture.
The second concerning outcome of a failed antenna
deployment is that power reflects off the stowed
antenna and causes the power amplifier to blow out.
This creates a break in the RF chain preventing all
transmissions. This failure has been observed multiple
times while ground testing radio hardware when proper
handling procedures were not followed. There is no
telemetry or other data available to refute this, other
than the extensive testing and flight heritage of the
deployment mechanism.

Figure 2: Wire mod to bypass fragile trace applied
to the system board

ELECTRICAL FAILURE MODES

Another possibility considered is that the spacecraft
antenna failed to deploy. There are two primary
concerns if the antenna doesn’t deploy. First, the signal
strength of the radio transmissions is noticeably
reduced, making it nearly impossible to close the link,
however the transmissions are typically still visible
using a software defined radio. One of our previous
missions, ExoCube, experienced an antenna failure
which resulted in this situation. That failure was most
likely caused by a bad solder joint. Based on the
lessons learn from ExoCube the antenna deployment
mechanism was redesigned and all solder connections
are now on a PCB. Redundant burn circuits were also
added to allow recovery if one of the circuits fails. This
new design, as seen in Figure 3, was extensively tested
on the ground with different simulated environments. It
John M. Bellardo

Causes evaluated in this category are all related to
electrical failures that may result in the spacecraft’s
failure to transmit. The three modes discussed in this
paper include the failure of the antenna burn resistor, a
low battery voltage during the burn event, and a failure
to charge the onboard batteries.
The failure of both burn resistors would cause the
antenna to not deploy. The consequences of a stowed
antenna were discussed in the material section. The
process of heating up the resistor enough to melt the
restraining line requires exceeding the design limit of
the part, causing internal damage to the component.
Ground testing showed a resistor is viable for three
burns before it needs to be replaced. Due to this
4
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limitation the burn resistors flown on ISX had never
been used (replacing them after testing is part of the
standard operating procedure). They are also protected
from accidental burns by shorting them with an
ammeter.
These procedures, and the redundant
resistors, make it unlikely a faulty burn resistor caused
the ISX anomaly.

occurred on orbit, and the built-in recovery mechanisms
couldn’t resolve it, the spacecraft couldn’t boot. While
possible, this was rated as an acceptable risk due to the
numerous ground observations of the recovery process
never failing.
During the later stages of testing the ISX flight software
a radio issue was identified in the transmit chain of the
half-duplex radio. Based on diagnostics that the time it
was determined the most likely cause was a timing
issue when the software didn’t wait long enough
between switching the RF amplifier on and transmitting
data. A change was made to increase the time between
the two events. After the change the anomaly was not
observed. The same anomaly was not observed on
previous missions, despite using the same hardware and
software. It is possible that batch inconsistencies in the
underlying electronics either masked or exasperated the
anomaly.

Another possibility is the battery voltage was too low to
properly drive the burn resistors, but still high enough
to operate the other spacecraft electronics. A low
battery state was observed on the flight unit during the
final battery charge activity. Due to launch vehicle
delays the spacecraft sat integrated in its dispenser for
approximately seven months. There was an opportunity
about a month prior to launch to de-integrate and
recharge the batteries. At that time the batteries were
too low for the spacecraft to boot, increasing the
likelihood of a low state of charge on deployment.
However, the solar cells on ISX should have been able
to provide enough charge in the time between dispenser
deployment and antenna deployment to drive the burn
resistors.

CONCLUSIONS
The ISX anomaly and resulting fault tree analysis lead
to a number of valuable conclusions.
First, it
emphasized the need to always test the spacecraft well
beyond the launch-provider requirements. That was
done with ISX, including many antenna deployment
and radio tests, but it was insufficient to identify the
anomaly on the ground.

This naturally leads to question whether ISX
experienced a charging failure, which, when combined
with a low deployment state of charge, prevented the
antenna from deploying or the radio from transmitting.
During spacecraft checkout all cells were shown to
generate voltage in the cleanroom. Absent an accurate
solar simulator, however, their actual power generation
was never measured. Given the redundancy that comes
with the electrical layout of 4 series of cells, it is less
likely that all four groups failed at the same time
independently of each other. The passive magnets used
to orient the spacecraft ensure the cells are illuminated,
reducing the possibility that poor pointing impacts
power generation. The overall power budget for the
spacecraft without the payload operating (the default
state on deployment) was exceptionally positive,
reducing the likelihood that an under provisioned
system prevented charging.

The second takeaway is that the importance of
documentation in an anomaly investigation cannot be
understated. There were many branches to the fault tree
that should have been deemed highly unlikely, but, due
to less rigorous documentation, could not be closed out.
Recollections of responsible engineers are not sufficient
in this case.
Finally, specific details about potential anomaly causes
is expected to help the larger CubeSat community in
there continued push to improve mission success.
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SOFTWARE FAILURE MODES
The failure analysis for ISX focused on two areas, a
general startup error and a timing error within the radio
code.
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